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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between international con‡ict and
the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargain-
ing and non-peaceful confrontations are possible. We show how the size
distribution of countries depends on the likelihood, bene…ts and costs of
con‡ict and war. We also study the role of international law and show how
better de…ned international ’property rights’ may lead to country breakup
and more numerous local con‡icts.
1 Introduction
In the last decade the reduction in the probability of con‡ict between an Eastern
bloc and a Western bloc has been accompanied by: 1) the breakup of several
countries, leading to a sharp increase in the number of independent political
units in the world1, and 2) an increase in the number of regional con‡icts. In
1985, close to the end of the cold war, there were 170 countries in the word (of
which 34 in Europe); today there are 192 countries in the world (of which 44
in Europe). Several commentators have argued that some of the past con‡icts,
for instance those involving Iraq and Kuwait and the following tensions, the war
between Ethiopia and the newly independent Eritrea, and the renewed con‡icts
in the Balkans, would not have exploded in the bipolar word of the East-West
1In this paper we refer to “independent political unit”, “country” and “nation” interchenge-
ably. When we present our model of country formation, we will de…ne “countries” precisely
within our analytical frameweork
1con‡ict.2 A related argument concerns the size of the “peace dividend,” that is,
the reduction of military spending that has followed the end of the cold war. The
size of the peace dividend has been less spectacular than one may have hoped,
perhaps because regional instability has increased even though the East-West
tension has declined.
These observations motivate the following questions: How does the possibility
of international con‡ict and warfare relate to the size distribution of countries? Is
it possible that a reduction in the probability of a global con‡ict can be associated
with more widespread local con‡icts? How does the “peace dividend” depend on
changes in the probability of con‡ict when the size distribution of countries is
endogenous?
In this paper we provide a model where secessions, uni…cations and wars are
possible, and derive implications that may help to shed some light on the above
observations. This paper contributes to the economic literature on the size distri-
bution of countries.3 While in our previous work we emphasized bene…ts of size
emerging from economy of scale in the provision of public goods and from the
size of the market, in this paper we focus on the bene…ts of size that arise form
considerations of international security. In a way, we build on an old tradition
of political analysis: the trade-o¤ between security and the ability to form a ho-
mogenous polis has concerned people at least since the times of classical Greece
and Renaissance Italy.4 In a companion paper (Alesina and Spolaore, 2000) we
study the relationship between con‡ict and number of nations in a model in
which con‡ict occurs between randomly-matched individuals. By contrast, in
this paper we focus on the formation and break-up of political jurisdictions when
countries face a more general con‡ict-resolution technology, in which both in-
ternational peaceful bargaining and non-peaceful confrontations between nations
are explicitly modeled within a game-theoretical framework. In this paper the
emergence and resolution of con‡ict is linked to the geographical distribution of
regions. Such a framework allows us to analyze how some important changes in
the international environment may a¤ect the determination of political borders.
In particular, we study the link between the rule of ‘international law’ and the
incentives to form larger political unions.
Our work attempts to build a bridge between the literature on country for-
mation and the literature on con‡ict resolution and arms races, pioneered by
Schelling (1960), Boulding (1962), Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), and Tullock
2For instance, see Hobsbawn (1994).
3Contributions include Friedman (1977), Casella and Feinstein (1990), Wei (1992), Bolton
and Roland (1997), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), and Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (1997).
A discussion of this literature is provided in Bolton, Roland, and Spolaore (1996).
4See Dahl and Tufte (1973).
2(1974; 1980)5 Formal and empirical analyses of the relationship between wars
and domestic institutions for given country borders are provided by Gar…nkel
(1994) and Hess and Orphanides (1995, 1997). The stability of empires in a
model with con‡ict is studied by Findlay (1996). Of course, the economic liter-
ature on con‡ict and wars is only a fraction of the much larger political-science
literature on these topics. For instance, some recent contributions within the
…eld of political science and international relations are discussed in Brown, Cote,
Lynn-Jones and Miller (1998).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a model of in-
ternational con‡ict between countries of given size and defense capabilities. In
particular, we study under what conditions con‡ict would be resolved through
peaceful bargaining or open warfare. In Section 3 we embed our model of con‡ict
into a dynamic framework in which countries and defense spending are endoge-
nously determined in equilibrium. We show how the number and size of countries
depend on the probability, bene…ts and costs of con‡ict and war. In particular,
we show how a decrease in the probability of con‡ict and/or war may lead to more
con‡ict and wars in equilibrium because of the endogenous breakup of countries.
Section 4 explores an extension: the introduction of some form of international
law. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modeling international con‡ict
In this section we develop a simple model of international con‡ict between coun-
tries of given size. That is, we assume that wars can take place only between
countries that have been already formed.6 In the following sections we will embed
this con‡ict resolution in a model of endogenous country formation.
Following the economic literature on wars, we model con‡ict as appropria-
tive/distributional, i.e., over the sharing of an economically valuable “pie.” More
speci…cally, we assume that international con‡ict may arise when international
control rights over some valuable resource are not speci…ed or not enforceable.
While this speci…c reason for wars is not uncommon, our model of con‡ict can
be interpreted more generally, as discussed in Appendix A.1.
5More recent contributions are surveyed in various chapters in Hartley and Sandler (1995).
See also Hirshleifer (1989; 1991; and 1995). A related line of research focuses on domestic
con‡ict and insurrections - for instance, see Grossman (1991) and Grossman and Kim (1995).
6Therefore, we do not model civil wars explicitly. As we will see, when we embed our
model of con‡ict into a model of endogenous country formation, “civil wars” will be implicitly
considered as part of the costs of forming a larger, more heterogenous political unit.
3For simplicity, we will focus on bilateral con‡icts. While multilateral con-
‡icts and alliances are certainly important and have been studied extensively in
the literature, we abstract from them in this analysis.7 Consider two countries
(country j and country j0). Suppose that there exists a resource R on which both
countries have claims, e.g., oil reserves located in international waters between
the two countries, or, more generally, anything valuable to both countries and
upon which international control rights are not speci…ed or not enforceable. The
countries may resolve their potential con‡ict with war or bargaining. Wars are
costly: if country j goes to war, its aggregate cost is given by cj ¸ 0: For simplic-
ity, and without much loss of generality, we assume that war costs are constant
across countries, i.e., cj = cj0 = c ¸ 0.
Each country has a strategy set of two: ¾j = ¾j0 = ffight; bargaing.8 The
payo¤s are as follows. When both countries decide to …ght, the net payo¤s are
u
j
ff =
dj
dj + dj0
R ¡ c (1)
u
j0
ff =
dj0
dj + dj0
R ¡ c (2)
where dj (dj0) is military spending in country j (j0).9
This speci…cation closely follows the literature on con‡ict resolution, where
the relative spending on defense determines the likelihood of winning, or the
relative fraction of the splitting of the pie. In case of risk neutrality (which we
assume) the two interpretations are identical in terms of expected utility.
If both countries choose to bargain, we adopt a Nash bargaining solution
to share the pie. For the disagreement point we choose, quite naturally, the
war outcome. Under these assumptions, the Nash bargaining solution implies
allocations shares ®¤
j and
¡
1 ¡ ®?
j
¢
, such that
u
j
bb = ®
¤
jR (3)
7As we will brie‡y discuss, one could reinterpret our concept of “political unit/country”
to encompass tight alliances in which decisions over defense and con‡ict are completely and
credibly centralized.
8For simplicty, we rule out the option of “surrender without a …ght.” Alternatively, we could
allow for such a strategy and assume that it is always dominated by either …ght or bargain.
9This speci…cation is a special case of the more general “con‡ict resolution technology” in
which country j’s “probability of winning” is given by
Ã(dj)
Ã(dj) + Ã(dj0)
See Tullock (1980), Hirshleifer (1989, 1995), and Gar…nkel (1994).
4u
j0
bb = (1 ¡ ®
¤
j)R (4)
where
®
¤
j = argmax[®jR ¡
dj
dj + dj0
R + c][(1 ¡®j)R ¡
dj0
dj + dj0
R + c]
s:t: ®jR ¸
dj
dj + dj0
R ¡ c; (1 ¡®j)R ¸
dj0
dj + dj0
R ¡ c
which gives10
®
¤
j =
dj
dj + dj0
(5)
For c = 0, the two countries obtain the same net payo¤s no matter whether they
engage in open warfare or in Nash bargaining. For any c > 0, the bargaining
outcome Pareto dominates the …ght outcome. However, (bargain, bargain) may
not be an equilibrium.
In order to illustrate this point we need to specify the payo¤s for the (bargain,
…ght) and the (…ght, bargain) outcomes. When country j chooses to …ght while
country j0 chooses to bargain we denote their respective payo¤s as
u
j
fb =
dj
dj + dj0
R + Ej ¡ c (7)
u
j0
fb =
dj0
dj + dj0
R ¡ ej0 ¡ c (8)
The idea is that, while the decision to …ght by at least one country will always
trigger an open con‡ict in which both countries will eventually …ght, the …rst
country to mobilize for war may enjoy a “…rst-striker’s advantage”. Ej ¸ 0 de-
notes this “…rst striker’s advantage” (“surprise gain”): it measures the additional
gain that country j can obtain by engaging in open warfare while country j0 pro-
poses to bargain.11 Conversely, ej0 ¸ 0 denotes country j0 “surprise loss,” i.e.,
10It is immediate to see that, when the costs associated with open con‡ict are asymmetric,
countries that are “weak” in terms of military strenght but face low “war costs” may obtain
more at the bargaining table than countries with bigger muscles but also larger war costs.
Speci…cally, for cj 6= cj0, we have
®¤
j =
dj
dj + dj0
+
cj0 ¡ cj
2R
provided that both countries obtain through bargaining at least as much as they would
through open con‡ict. In this paper we will not pursue this immediate extension and maintain
the simplifying assumption that war costs are symmetric across countries.
11On these issues a classical discussion is Shelling (1966). See also Van Evera (1998).
5the loss that country j0 would su¤er should propose to bargain while the other
country attacks.
One can think of Ei as the sum of three components: 1) the bene…ts stemming
from a higher probability of winning because of a surprise attack; 2) lower war
costs (hence, Ei may be a function of c); 3) other economic and political bene…ts .
Analogously, ei includes the costs due to 1) a lower probability of winning when
a country is taken “by surprise”; 2) higher war damage; 3) other economic and
political costs.12 Analogously, if country j decides to bargain while country j0
“strikes,” their respective payo¤s are:
u
j
bf =
dj
dj + dj0
R ¡ ej ¡c (9)
u
j0
bf =
dj0
dj + dj0
R + Ej0 ¡c (10)
Clearly, if Ej = Ej0 = ej = ej0 = c = 0; all strategies are payo¤-equivalent.
It is immediate to verify that:
Fact 1
The strategy pro…le (…ght, …ght), is always a Nash equilibrium.13 It is the
unique Nash equilibrium if and only if maxfEj; Ej0g > c ¸ 0. The strategy
pro…le (bargain, bargain), is also a Nash equilibrium if and only if maxfEj;
Ej0g ￿ c.
That is, open con‡ict is the only Nash equilibrium if and only if the advantage
of a surprise strike more than o¤sets the costs of open warfare for at least one
country. Note that, in equilibrium, there will be no “surprise attack,” and, for
any c > 0, both countries will be worse o¤ than they would be had they bargained
(the game is a standard Prisoner’s dilemma). A high enough “temptation” to
strike induces open con‡ict as the unique suboptimal equilibrium.
On the other hand, bargaining can be sustained as an equilibrium if and only
if the costs of open con‡ict are higher than the temptation to strike for both coun-
tries. When maxfEj; Ej0g ￿ c; (…ght, …ght) is still a Nash equilibrium. However,
for any c > 0; (bargain, bargain) Pareto dominates (…ght, …ght):14 (bargain, bar-
gain) also dominates the mixed equilibrium that exists for maxfEj; Ej0g ￿ c:
12In general, both Ei and ei may be modeled as function of R and/or c: Our results would
not be a¤ected by those speci…cations.
13When maxfEj; Ej0g ￿ c; (…ght, …ght) is not an equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies
as long as ej > 0 and ej0 > 0.
14Note that, for maxfEj; Ej0g ￿ c; our game is a general case of the “stag hunt” game
cited in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Farrell (1988), and discussed in Aumann (1990). See
also Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 20-21). For an application to international relations in a
di¤erent but related context see Jervis (1978).
6In the rest of the analysis we will abstract from mixed-strategy equilibria. Our
results will not be a¤ected.
What is the most reasonable prediction of how this game will be played?
Clearly, if the …rst-striker’s advantage is high enough, the only Nash equilibrium
is given by “both countries …ght,” and open warfare is the only noncooperative
equilibrium outcome in a one-shot game. When the …rst striker’s advantage is
lower than direct war costs, open warfare and peaceful bargaining are both Nash
equilibria. So is a mixed equilibrium in which each country …ghts and bargains
with positive probabilities. However, this multiplicity of equilibria is reduced
to a unique equilibrium when the re…nement of coalition-proofness is introduced:
only the Pareto-dominant (bargain, bargain) equilibrium is robust to coordinated
deviations. The following holds:
Fact 2
If maxfEj; Ej0g > c > 0; the strategy pro…le (…ght, …ght) is the unique
Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium. If maxfEj; Ej0g ￿ c > 0; the strategy pro…le
(bargain, bargain), is the unique Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium.15
In other words, when (bargain, bargain) is a Nash equilibrium, two coun-
tries that are able to “communicate” could jointly move away from the “bad
equilibrium” (…ght, …ght) and “coordinate” to the “good equilibrium” (bargain,
bargain): As the good equilibrium is Nash, it can be supported without any
speci…c commitment technology.16
In summary, using the coalition-proof re…nement, this game has an unam-
biguous outcome: war if the …rst striker’s advantage is higher than war costs in
at least one country, peaceful bargaining otherwise. As we discuss below, the con-
cept of coalition-proof equilibrium is a natural choice when we embed our model
of con‡ict into a model of endogenous country formation and defense spending.
While we will focus upon Coalition-proof Nash as our equilibrium concept, we
will also compare the predictions of coalition-proof equilibria with the predictions
of alternative equilibrium concepts (Strong Nash and standard subgame perfect
equilibrium).
15For a formal de…nition of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium see Bernheim, Peleg and Whin-
ston (1987). For every two-player game, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides
with the set of Nash equilibria that are not Pareto dominated by any other Nash equilibrium.
16The logic behind the concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium appears compelling when
two sovereign countries have the meansand the opportunity to engagein preplay communication
and make it known to each other that they intend to bargain rather than to …ght, if that is to
their mutual advantage, and if it is a Nash equilibrium. However, communication may not be
su¢cient. As we will brie‡y discuss below, in some circumstances lack of “trust” may prevent
such coordination (Aumann, 1990)
73 Endogenous countries
Now, we use our model of international con‡ict within a framework in which both
defense spending and country borders are endogenous.
3.1 The model
The “world” is a set of regions, each inhabited by a (discrete) number of homoge-
neous individuals. For simplicity, we normalize the number of individuals in each
region to one. Appendix A.3 shows that our results do not change if we allow
for the number of individuals in each region to be equal to any strictly positive
integer. Each region borders two others. We need a minimum of four regions to
make our points; in fact, four is the minimum even number of regions such that
uni…cation does not necessarily imply total elimination of international con‡ict.
Two regions are located in the “West” (region W1 and region W2) and two are
located in the “East” (region E1 and region E2). Western regions are contiguous
and so are Eastern regions. To …x ideas, we assume that the four regions are
distributed as points on a circle (…gure 1). The segment connecting a pair of
regions measures the portion of world surface to which both regions have access
(i.e., seas between them). Regions cannot split by assumption, but regions can
merge to form countries composed of more than one region. Therefore, if two
regions merge the portion of the world which is in between them becomes part
of the uni…ed country.
As we will make clear below, in our model a “country” is de…ned as an inde-
pendent political unit in which a) defense is completely and credibly centralized;
b) a uni…ed government takes decisions over bargaining and war strategies; and
c) the “net returns” from con‡ict are distributed across its citizens.17
Consistently with the literature on country formation, we assume that the
formation of a larger, less homogeneous country implies some “heterogeneity”
costs.18 Those costs can have multiple sources. They may be related to het-
erogenous preferences over public policies, coordination costs, monitoring costs.
In some cases, part of these costs may come from the expected losses associated
with the possibility of a civil war, or other major domestic upheavals due to high
heterogeneity within a country. For simplicity we assume that the heterogeneity
costs of forming a country including both an Eastern and a Western region are
prohibitive. By contrast, if E1 and E2 form a uni…ed country, each individual in
17Therefore, in principle, tight supranational alliances could be classi…ed as “countries” in
our framework insofar as they satisfy our de…nition. In practice, states that join actual military
alliances tend to retain sovereignity on most matters sub a)-c).
18In particular, see Alesina, Perotti and Spolaore (1995), Bolton, Roland and Spolaore (1996),
Alesina and Spolaore (1997), and Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000).
8each region will bear a cost 0 ￿ he < 1. Analogously, if W1 and W2 form a
uni…ed country, each individual in each region will bear a cost hw: Without loss
of generality, we impose 0 ￿ hw ￿ he:
We also assume that heterogeneity costs are the same for every member of
a country, namely they do not depend on the location of each individual within
the country.19
The utility function for each individual i is
ui = yi ¡ ti + ri ¡ ±ihi
where yi is the individual’s income, ti measures the individual’s taxes, ri
measuresthe individual’s net returnsfrom“con‡ict resolution,” asspeci…ed below
(including direct “war costs” and “surprise gains or losses,” if any), ±i is a binary
index which takes value 0 if the individual lives in an independent region and
value 1 otherwise. Finally, we have hi = hw if the individual lives in a Western
region, whilst hi = he if the individual lives in an Eastern region.
Borders, taxes and returns from con‡ict resolution are endogenously deter-
mined as equilibrium outcomes of an extensive game that we will specify below.
Let dj denote defense in country j: One unit of defense costs one unit of income
and is …nanced through a proportional income tax. The tax rate is denoted with
¿j: Let Sj denote the set of individuals in country j: Then we have that
¿j
X
i2Sj
yi = dj
For simplicity, we will abstract from ex-ante income inequality, and assume
that each individual in the world has the same income (before taxes and before
con‡ict resolution): yi = y. Therefore, the above budget constraint equation
simpli…es to
¿jsjy = dj
where sj ´ jSjj is the number of individuals in country j:20
Defense is used to set potential con‡icts with neighboring countries. Con-
sistently with the model presented in the previous section, we consider a simple
19This assumption is simpler than the setup of Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2000) where the
heterogeneity costs depended on individuals’ location on an ideological and/or geographical
line.
20sj is either 1 or 2. For a more general speci…cation see Appendix A.3.
9“distributional con‡ict”: somewhere on the circle there exits a valuable natural
resource, which will be discovered with probability ¼ after political borders and
defense allocations have been decided.. This order of moves underlies a “tim-
ing” that we regard as realistic. That is, we assume that borders are set before
defense spending is decided, and defense must be in place before actual con‡ict
arises. This timing makes sense within a dynamic framework by noting that: a)
border changes are more costly than changes in defense spending, and, in fact,
are observed more rarely; and b) building defense takes time.
Finally, we also assume that, when borders and defense are decided, individ-
uals do not know whether, should a con‡ict arise, it will be resolved through
bargaining or through war. It seems appropriate to assume that the precise fea-
tures of potential con‡icts and their resolution are uncertain when borders and
defense investments are decided. The alternative would be to assume that every
time a secession or uni…cation is decided, and defense spending levels are cho-
sen, there is certainty about the incentives for armed con‡icts and/or peaceful
bargaining in future con‡icts.
Speci…cally, we assume a three-stage game with the following structure:
In the …rst stage, the individual in each region decides on whether its region
should form a uni…ed country with the neighboring region (E1 with E2 and
W1 with W2) or should form an independent country.21 Borders are decided
accordingly; namely a country is formed if and only if citizens in both regions
contemplating to form a country agree. In other words, in stage 1 each region
can choose from an action set of two. The action space of each player in each
region is: {decide for union, decide for independence}. If at least one Eastern
(Western) region prefers independence, the two Eastern (Western) regions will
form two independent countries. In other words, a uni…ed East will emerge if
and only if both E1 and E2 decide for uni…cation. Analogously, a uni…ed west
will emerge if and only if both W1 and W2 vote for uni…cation.
In stage two(i.e., afterbordershavebeen decided), agovernment iselected in
each country. After the election the government acts as a uni…ed ”agent,” namely
it is the unique player for each country in the following stages of the game. In
countries formed by one region, the government’s objective function is identical to
citizens’ utility.22 In countries formed by two regions, the government’s objective
21By assuming one individual in each region (or, more generally, M individuals with identical
preferences, as studied in Appendix A.3), we can abstract from issues of preference aggregation
within regions. In particular, any voting rule would deliver the same decision within each
region. Therefore, we will refer to a “region” as an individual player in the rest of the analysis.
22In other words, we assume that voters are able to elect an ideal “agent” as their government.
We abstract from issues such as the ability of the government to extract rents from its own
citizens. For a general discussion of alternative ways of modeling governments, see Grossman
(2000).
10is given by a weighted average of the utilities of the citizens in the two regions.
The underlying idea is that the political process will re‡ect the relative political
weights of the two regions. As we assume that the two regions have the same
population size and the same income per capita, it is natural to assume that their
relative weights are identical.
In each country j, the government chooses the level of defense spending dj,
where 0 ￿ dj ￿
P
i2Sj yi. Defense spending dj can take any real value between
zero and the maximum amount of resources available in the country.23As we will
see, preferences over defense are identical across individuals within each country.
Therefore, our assumption that defense is chosen by utility-maximizing govern-
ments is equivalent to having defense chosen through direct voting within each
country. However, it seems more realistic to assume that decisions over defense
and, in the third stage, war or bargain, are taken by centralized governments
rather than through direct-democracy referenda.
In stage three, after defense is decided, uncertainty is resolved, namely the
“location” of R and the value of E are revealed. In particular, we assume that,
with probability ¼; a “pie” of size R is found on a point along the circle. For
simplicity, and without much loss of generality, we assume that the probability
that R will ”located” between any two given regions is
¼
4:24 Moreover, we assume
that, with probability ½, the speci…c con‡ict at hand implies a …rst striker’s
advantage E larger than c, while, with probability 1 ¡ ½, we have E < c. In
our model, the di¤erence E ¡ c captures the incentives to unilaterally start a
war. Our assumption stems from the view that those incentives will depend on
technological, economic and political factors known only when the location and
the nature of the con‡ict are revealed.25 As mentioned above, the assumption
that uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of stage three re‡ects the plausible
view that building defense takes time, and by the time the existence and nature
of speci…c con‡icts are known, countries must have already invested in their own
defense. Depending on the location of the resource, at most two countries may
lay a claim on it.26 The resource R is allocated through bargaining or con‡ict.
In stage three, each government involved in con‡ict chooses …ght or bargain in
23For simplicity, we assume that the constraint dj ￿
P
i2Sj yi is never binding in equilibrium.
24One could easily extend the model to allow for di¤erent ex-ante probabilities of con‡ict
between pairs of regions.
25For simplicty, we do not model those factors explicitly. In a di¤erent framework, Hess
and Orphanides (1995, 1997) explore a governmnt’s incentives to start an “avoidable war” as
a function of economic and political conditions.
26As we already mentioned, to keep the analysis simple we implicitly assume that geography
and/or technology prevent third parties from getting involved in those bilateral con‡icts. In
other words, we rule out the possibility of transfer and/or commitment technologies that could
allow a third country to promise outside help to a country in con‡ict in exchange for a share
of the spoils.
11order to maximize the utility of its citizens as speci…ed above. At this terminal
stage, each government’s objective is equivalent to the maximization of “con‡ict
returns,” which we will specify consistently with our analysis in Section 2. In
particular, con‡ict returns to country j facing country j0 are:
dj
dj + dj0
R
when both countries bargain;
dj
dj + dj0
R ¡ c
when both countries …ght;
dj
dj + dj0
R + E ¡c
when country j chooses to …ght a bargaining opponent;
dj
dj + dj0
R ¡ e ¡ c
when country j proposes bargaining but country j0 chooses to …ght.27
In summary, we have an extensive-form game with eleven players (the four
regions, the six possible governments, and nature).28 In stage one, the four
regions move. The regions endogenously determine which governments are going
to move in stage two. Depending on the regions’ combinations of strategies, there
are sixteen possible nodes, that are associated with four possible con…gurations
of the world (four independent countries, a uni…ed East and two independent
countries in the West, a uni…ed West and two independent countries in the East,
two uni…ed countries). In stage two up to a maximum of four governments move.
As they can choose defense spending along a continuum, their actions lead to an
in…nite number of possible subgames in stage 3. At the beginning of stage three,
“nature” moves and chooses whether a potential con‡ict will take place, where,
and whether E is larger or smaller than c. Then, at most two governments move.
Depending on the endogenous choice of political borders in stage one, and on the
moves by governments in stage three, actual con‡icts and possibly wars will be
observed. Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the game.
27Without loss of generality, we assume that the “surprise loss” is the same across countries.
28In Appendix A.3 we consider the more general case in which M ¸ 1 individuals live in each
region. Then, the extensive-form game has 4M+6+1 players.
123.2 Equilibria
In our analysis we focus upon Coalition-Proof Nash equilibria. More precisely,
as we have an extensive-form game, we will use the extensive-form re…nement of
the concept, Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium, as de…ned in Bernheim,
Peleg and Whinston (1987).
When looking at coalition-proof equilibria, one needs to considerdeviations by
“coalitions” of players.29 It is important to note that the concept of “coalition,”
in this context, should not be confused with the concepts of “region,” “country,”
or “government.” In this paper, the word “coalition” will be used consistently
with the technical de…nition of coalition-proof equilibria, i.e., as any subset of
players. Therefore, we refer to “coalitions of governments” in stage two and
three, and “coalitions of regions” in stage one, simply as subsets of players that
may jointly deviate from any proposed equilibrium. In particular, note that a
“coalition of regions” is just a subset of players, while a “country” formed by one
or two regions is the outcome of a strategy pro…le.
Our game has a unique Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium, which can
be derived as follows.30
First, we restrict all possible pairs of governments to play Pareto undomi-
nated equilibria in all two-player subgames of the terminal stage. In other words,
governments will play “bargain” if E ￿ c and “…ght” if E > c.
We will then consider the subgames consisting of the terminal two-stage
games. We will show that, given the payo¤s supported by stage-three equilibria,
for each possible con…guration of countries, there exists a unique Nash equilib-
rium in which each government chooses a speci…c level of defense. We will show
that the unique Nash equilibrium in the terminal two-stage subgame is coalition-
proof. We will then consider the game played by the four regions in the …rst
stage. In the …rst stage, each strategy pro…le implies a given con…guration of the
29More speci…cally, the de…nition of coalition-proof equilibrium proceeds by induction on the
size of all possible coalitions of players. As in the standard de…nition of Nash equilibrium,
one requires that no “one-player coalition” can improve its situation by deviating. Then, the
de…nition requires that no “two-player coalition” can improve the situation of its members by
deviating, but the only joint deviations that are allowed are those from which no member of
the deviating coalition has an incentive to deviate individually. In other words, all two-player
deviations must be Nash equilibria of the two-player game induced by holding the strategies of
all the other players …xed. Then, for games with more than two players, three-player coalitions
are considered, etc., all the way to the “grand coalition” of all players.
30After we derive the coalition-proof equilibrium for this game, we will discuss why we believe
that the concept of coalition-proof equilibrium is the natural equilibrium concept within our
context.
13world, to which unique equilibrium payo¤ vectors are associated. Each region will
play coalition-proof equilibrium strategies. We will show that those equilibrium
strategies characterize a unique equilibrium con…guration of the world for given
values of the parameters.
In summary, for a given vector of parameters (he; hw; ¼; R, ½; c) we can …nd
unique values for a) the equilibrium number and size distribution of countries;
b) the equilibrium distribution of defense levels per capita across countries, and
c) the equilibrium probabilities of international con‡ict and war. Note that ¼
measures the probability of a “potential” con‡ict, and ½ the probability that,
should a con‡ict arise, it will be solved through war. The probability of observing
an actual international con‡ict, and the probability than an actual warwill indeed
occur, are both endogenous variables within our model, since they depend on the
size distribution of countries.
3.2.1 Equilibrium defense and expected returns from con‡ict
We will now derive the equilibrium levels of defense spending and the equilibrium
returns from con‡ict for each possible con…guration of countries.
Lemma 1
Equilibrium defense spending per capita in country i is given by
di =
¼R
8si
Proof: in Appendix.
This result shows that, by forming a larger union, equilibrium defense per
capita is reduced. By de…ning “expected con‡cit returns” for each country as its
expected share of R minus expected war costs, we have the following
Lemma 2
For every con…guration of countries and for every country of size si, expected
con‡ict returns per capita in equilibrium are given by
¼R
4
¡
¼
2
½c
si
Thus, in equilibrium, when wars are either impossible (½ = 0) or costless
(c = 0), individuals within each country will obtain the same expected returns
14from con‡ict, irrespectively of whether they live in a large country or in a small
country. However, because of Lemma 1, individuals living in a large country
enjoy a bene…t from size: their expected return comes “cheaper,” i.e., at a lower
cost in terms of defense per capita. In other words, a larger size brings about net
economies of scale in defense. In addition, when wars are possible (½ > 0) and
costly (c > 0), a larger size reduces expected war costs.
3.2.2 Equilibrium number and size of countries
The above analysis of equilibrium defense spending and equilibrium expected
returns from con‡ict point to a scale advantage: larger countries can exploit
economies of scale in defense. However, these bene…ts have to be weighted against
the higher heterogeneity costs. We are now ready to study under what conditions
the bene…ts from size associated with con‡ict resolution are larger or smaller than
the heterogeneity costs.
Lemma 3
Given heterogeneity cost hk (k = w;e), and given the equilibrium payo¤s
associated with all possible con…gurations of countries (i.e., with all terminal two-
stage subgames), individuals will (strictly) prefer to live in a two-region country
rather than in an independent region if and only if
¼
4
(
R
4
+ ½c) > hk
Proof: in Appendix
The term
¼
4(
R
4 + ½c) can be interpreted as “net con‡ict bene…ts from uni…ca-
tion,” i.e., as those bene…ts stemming from lower defense spending per capita and
lower expected war costs in a larger country. Lemma 3 states the intuitive result
that uni…cation will be more likely to be preferred to independence the higher
the probability and/or relevance of a potential con‡ict and the higher the prob-
ability that the con‡ict leads to open warfare, and the lower the heterogeneity
costs associated with uni…cation.
Proposition 1
For all 0 < hw ￿ he; ¼ ¸ 0, c ¸ 0 and 0 ￿ ½ ￿ 1; in equilibrium we will
have:
1) Four independent regions (N = 4) if and only if
¼
4
(
R
4
+ ½c) ￿ hw:
152) A uni…ed West and two independent countries in the East (N = 3) if and only
if
hw <
¼
4
(
R
4
+ ½c) ￿ he:
3) A uni…ed West and a uni…ed East (N = 2) if and only if
¼
4
(
R
4
+ ½c) > he:
Proof: in Appendix
This proposition states the intuitive result that, when the “con‡ict bene…ts”
from uni…cation are lower than the lowest heterogeneity costs (i.e.,¼
4(R
4 + ½c) <
hw), independence is the equilibrium strategy in each region. If hw < ¼
4(R
4 +
½c) < he; the bene…ts from uni…cation are high enough to compensate Western
regions for their (lower) heterogeneity costs, but are too small to make uni…cation
worthwhile in the East, where heterogeneity costs are assumed to be higher. If
¼
4(R
4 + ½c) > he; uni…cation is the equilibrium strategy everywhere.
3.3 Discussion
Why should we focus on coalition-proof equilibria rather than some other equally
plausible notion of equilibrium? We believe that the concept of coalition-proof
equilibria provides a natural and useful prediction of how the game should be
played at each stage. Let’s move backwards:
-) In stage three, the coalition-proof re…nement allows the natural selec-
tion of a unique equilibrium when multiple Nash equilibria are possible. As long
as governments can freely communicate, it seems reasonable to predict that the
equilibrium outcome should be given by the unique coalition-proof equilibrium.
Such an equilibrium will imply open warfare when that is the only Nash equilib-
rium (a prisoner’s dilemma situation), but peaceful bargaining when bargaining
itself is a Nash equilibrium.
What about using a stronger concept, such as Aumann’s (1959) Strong Nash
equilibrium? In contrast to coalition-proof equilibrium, deviations by coalitions
in Strong Nash equilibria do not need to be “credible” (in particular, they do
not need to be Nash equilibria for the deviating coalition). Hence Strong Nash
equilibria, unlike coalition-proof equilibria, must always be Pareto e¢cient (oth-
erwise, the grand coalition would deviate). When peaceful bargaining is the
coalition-proof equilibrium, it is also Strong Nash. However, when war is the
16coalition-proof equilibrium outcome, it is not a Strong Nash equilibrium. In our
model, for c > 0, war is not Pareto e¢cient: both governments would deviate and
move to bargain. However, when peaceful bargaining is not a Nash equilibrium,
such a deviation cannot be enforced in the absence of some speci…c commitment
technology. As a result, when (…ght, …ght) is the unique coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium in the last-stage subgame, the game has no Strong Nash equilibrium.
In this context, as it is often the case, the concept of Strong Nash equilibrium
turns out to be “too strong.”31
-) In stage two, by focusing on coalition-proof equilibria we can consider
the possibility that coalitions of governments, while remaining fully independent,
jointly “coordinate” their defense spending.32 As it is reasonable to require when
considering agreements among sovereign states, in the absence of any external
commitment technology, any “coordination” must be sustainable as a Nash equi-
librium for those states.
As we have seen, a standard subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is su¢cient to
identify a unique level of defense spending for each country: there are no multiple
equilibria in defense spending. In other words, for every proper subgame con-
sisting of the terminal two-stages games, any subgame perfect equilibrium will
identify a unique vector of defense spending. That vector is also the equilibrium
defense spending that is observed in the unique perfectly coalition-proof equilib-
rium. In that respect, the re…nement of coalition-proofness does not play a role
as an equilibrium selection criterion when defense spending is considered. How-
ever, requiring coalition-proofness has other important bene…ts. Since sovereign
governments are able to communicate, a Nash equilibrium that were not robust
to “credible” joint deviations should be seen with suspicion. By making sure than
any subset of governments has no joint incentive to deviate from the proposed
equilibrium, we can ensure that our equilibrium is robust to any self-enforcing
international arms treaty among any possible subset of countries.33
Again, the comparison with the prediction of Strong Nash equilibria is in-
structive. We will show that there exists a unique coalition-proof equilibrium
with a positive level of defense in each country. By contrast, one can show that
31Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) introduced the concept of coalition-proof equilib-
rium as a weakening of the concept of Strong Nash, which they explicitly viewed as “too strong.”
Analogously, the extensive-form notion of ”strong perfect equilibria” proposed by Rubinstein
(1980) would be “too strong” in our context.
32Of course, “coordination”in the level of defense spending would not prevent any government
to use it noncooperatively to its exclusive advantage should an actual con‡ict arise. In any case,
within our model, no “coordination” will arise in the coalition-proof equilibrium.
33In other words, only those “arm treaties” that rely on some additional commitment tech-
nology can improve upon the unique Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we assume that those
commitment technologies do not exist: agreements among sovereign states must be Nash.
17there exists no Strong Nash equilibrium level of defense. For any positive level of
defense, a proportional reduction in the level of defense across countries is always
Pareto improving. In fact, Pareto e¢ciency requires that each country should
spend zero on defense (defense is pure waste from a social perspective). However,
a world in which each country invests zero in its defense is not a Nash equilib-
rium. In such a world, each individual government has an incentive to invest in
a positive amount of defense and obtain certain victory should a con‡ict arise.
Consequently, no Strong Nash equilibrium exists.
-) Finally, in stage one, we consider possible deviations by subsets of re-
gions. The use of coalition-proofness is su¢cient to ensure that, in equilibrium,
regions will play a unique equilibrium.34 More importantly, the requirement of
coalition-proof ensures that equilibria are robust to (self-enforcing) joint devia-
tions by voters who belong to di¤erent regions. Conceptually, this requirement
is crucial when dealing with endogenous border formation, as any con…guration
of countries should be robust not only to unilateral deviations by individual re-
gions, but also to coordinated deviations by di¤erent regions. In other words,
a natural equilibrium criterion when considering endogenous borders should ex-
clude outcomes in which a subset of regions would be willing to deviate, and form
an alternative set of borders, from which no further deviation by the deviating
regions would occur.
While we have chosen to focus on coalition-proof equilibria, we are ready to
entertain the possibility that, in some context, a broader notion of equilibrium
could be usefully employed. For instance, in some historical circumstances, com-
munication between governments in con‡ict could be extremely di¢cult, and/or
mutual “trust” could be low35. In those cases, countries deciding over uni…cation
or independence may reasonably have pessimistic expectations over the outcome
of con‡ict, and, for instance, expect that con‡ict will be solved through …ght,
no matter whether E is larger or smaller than c. Pessimistic expectations over
34While there exist multiple Nash equilibria, they can be eliminated by ruling out equilibria
in weakly dominated strategies. If a region in the East (West) votes for independence, the
other region in the East (West) obtains the same utility no matter whether it votes for inde-
pendence or uni…cation. As a result, independence is always a Nash equilibrium. However, if
uni…cation is strictly better than independence for each region, deciding for independence is
a weakly dominated strategy. Obviously, uni…cation is the unique coalition-proof equilibrium
when uni…cation is preferred to independence in both regions.
35See Aumann (1990) for a critical view of the notion that preplay communication is su¢cient
to ensure the “self-enforceability” of any agreement to play the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
In our game, each player has an incentive to convince the other to bargain no matter whether
he himself plans to bargain or …ght. Now, consider a mistrustful player who would play the
Pareto-dominated but “risk-dominant” strategy “…ght” in the absence of communication. He
may see no reason to change his mind if informed that the other player suggests to bargain.
Therefore, preplay communication betwen governments may not be enough: some minimum
amount of “international trust” may be needed in order to sustain “bargain” as an equilibrium.
18the ability of governments in con‡ict to “coordinate” on the “good” bargaining
outcome may sustain an alternative equilibrium, that is, a subgame perfect but
not coalition-proof equilibrium characterized as follows:
For all 0 < hw ￿ he; ¼ ¸ 0, c ¸ 0 and 0 ￿ ½ ￿ 1; there exists a “pessimistic”
subgame perfect equilibrium (which is not coalition-proof), such that we will have
1) Four independent regions (N = 4) for
¼
4
(
R
4
+ c) ￿ hw:
2) A uni…ed West and two independent countries in the East (N = 3) if and only
if
hw <
¼
4
(
R
4
+ c) ￿ he:
3) A uni…ed West and a uni…ed East (N = 2) if and only if
¼
4
(
R
4
+ c) > he:
In other words, pessimistic beliefs over con‡ict resolution may induce the for-
mation of larger countries (i.e., a size distribution of countries that would be
consistent with coalition-proof equilibria only if ½ = 1). Optimistically, we see
our equilibrium selection based on the expectation of coordination as more re-
alistic in the modern world. However, we do not rule out a priori that alterna-
tive“pessimistic” equilibria may have been observed historically.
3.4 Comparative statics
We will now return to our equilibrium concept, as characterized in Proposition
1, and study the implied comparative statics for di¤erent values of the funda-
mental parameters. Proposition 1 states that the equilibrium number and size
of countries will endogenously depend on the relationship between probability
of a potential con‡ict (¼), importance of the con‡ict in utility’s terms (R), and
heterogeneity costs (he and hw). For given heterogeneity costs, a high ¼ and/or
a high R tend to be associated with larger countries, while a low ¼ and/or a low
R tend to be associated with more numerous, smaller countries.
Moreover, Proposition 1 shows that the number of countries depends posi-
tively on the probability that con‡ict will be resolved through military confronta-
tion (½) times the direct costs of military confrontation (c). A more “bellicose”
19world implies larger countries, while a reduction in the probability of war and/or
its costs induces country break up.
Note that the probability of observing an actual international con‡ict depends
not only on the probability that a potential con‡ict arises (¼), but also on the
number of countries, which depends endogenously on ¼. This endogenous link
may generate a paradoxical result: a lower probability of potential con‡ict may
be associated with a higher probability of actually observing an international
con‡ict in equilibrium.
Let Â denote the probability of an international con‡ict. By de…nition, it will
be given by
Â =
¼N
4
By using our Proposition, we can immediately derive the following
Corollary 1
For any hw ￿ he such that ¼0 >
16hw
R+4½c, consider a lower ¼00 <
16he
R+4½c: Let p(¼0)
denote the probability of an international con‡ict associated with f¼0; R; he; hw;
½; cg and let Â(¼00) denote the probability of an international con‡ict associated
with f¼00; R; he; hw; ½; cg: Then, Â(¼0) > Â(¼00) if and only if ¼0=¼00 > 2.
In other terms, the above corollary states that, for every vector of parameters
such that there exists two countries in equilibrium, there exists a range of smaller
¼0s; such that, for the same R and h, 1) four countries will result in equilibrium,
and 2) the probability of international con‡ict will be higher than in the equi-
librium with the higher ¼:36 The intuition is straightforward: while a smaller
¼ reduces the probability of international con‡ict for given borders, the smaller
chance that a con‡ict may arise reduces the incentives to form larger countries,
and, therefore, increases the number of countries in equilibrium. Therefore, some
con‡icts that would be resolved within domestic bordersare now resolved through
international confrontation. This indirect e¤ect may o¤set the direct e¤ect of a
reduction in ¼, and bring about an increase in the probability of observing an
international con‡ict.
On the other hand, note that, with a lower ¼, international con‡ict may be
more likely but it will also be more local (in our example, each actual con‡ict
will involve only half of the world rather than the whole world). By the same
token, one can note that a reduction in the probability that a con‡ict be solved
36A similar corollary can be derived when the number of countries goes from 2 to 3, or from
3 to 4.
20through open warfare (lower ½), by inducing a break-up of countries, may lead
to an increase in the probability that an actual war would be observed.
The endogenous reduction in the number and size of countries that may be
brought about by a lower probability of potential con‡ict can generate an ad-
ditional paradoxical e¤ect: a lower ¼ may induce higher defense per capita in
equilibrium. Certainly, defense per capita is increasing in ¼ for a given con…gura-
tion of countries. Therefore, a reduction in the probability ¼, for given borders,
induces a “peace dividend”: lower probability of con‡ict would translate into
lower defense per capita in each country. However, a lower ¼, by inducing a
reduction in the equilibrium size of countries, may lead to higher defense per
capita in equilibrium. Moreover, even when defense per capita does not increase
because of a higher ¼, any endogenous reduction in size implies a level of de-
fense per capita higher than the level one would observed should borders remain
unchanged. In other words, the endogenous link between probability of con‡ict,
defense spending, and size of countries points to reasons why a “peace dividend”
may be reduced or completely o¤set by a break-up of countries. Formally, we can
state the following
Corollary 2
For any hw ￿ he such that ¼0 > 16hw
R+4½c, consider a lower ¼00 < 16he
R+4½c: By
Lemma 1, we have that defense per capita at the higher level of ¼ is given by
d(¼
0) =
¼0R
16
while defense per capita at the lower level of ¼ is given by
d(¼
00) =
¼00R
8
Therefore, we have that d(¼0) > d(¼00) if and only if ¼0=¼00 > 2.
Note that, even when d(¼0) > d(¼00), the peace dividend that is associated
with a break-up of countries is given by
PDbreak = d(¼
0) ¡ d(¼
00) =
R
16
[¼
0 ¡ 2¼
00]
Such “peace dividend” is smaller than the peace dividend that would be observed
in the absence of country break-up, that is:
PDnobreak =
R
16
[¼
0 ¡ ¼
00]
214 International Law
Even when wars have no costs (c = 0), all expenses in defense are pure waste
from an e¢ciency perspective. A more e¢cient solution would be for countries
to agree in advance (i.e., before the ‘location’ of R is known) about a partition
of the world in ‘spheres of in‡uence’ such that each country would have complete
‘control rights’ (that is, ‘international property rights’) over all resources R that
fall within its sphere. In particular, the …rst best could be achieved by having the
four independent regions dividing the circle into four equal segments, and spend
nothing on defense. However, in the absence of some form of enforcement, each
country has an incentive to deviate from such a solution, invest in its own force,
and “invade” its neighbors’ spheres of in‡uence.
While a complete partition can be beyond enforcement, in some ‘world orders’
a partial partition may be enforceable through some form of “international law”,
backed by an international enforcement agency and/or by widely respected social
norms. In particular, suppose that the existing international law allowsa “secure”
area of size » < 1=4 around each region. Then, only when R falls outside the
sphere (“anarchic area”) there is actual con‡ict.
Proposition 1 can then be easily generalized to:
Proposition 2
For all 0 < hw ￿ he; ¼ ¸ 0, c ¸ 0, 0 ￿ ½ ￿ 1; and 0 ￿ » ￿ 1=4; in equilibrium
we will have
1) Four independent regions (N = 4) if and only if
¼
4
(
1
4
¡ »)(
R
4
+ ½c) < hw
.2) A uni…ed West and two independent countries in the East (N = 3) if and
only if
hw <
¼
4
(
1
4
¡ »)(
R
4
+ ½c) ￿ he
3) A uni…ed West and a uni…ed East (N = 2) if and only if
¼
4
(
1
4
¡ »)(
R
4
+ ½c) > he:
Therefore, an expansion of international control rights reduces the importance
of national defense and brings about the formation of smaller countries in equilib-
rium. However, it is immediate to see that, for the same reasons why a reduction
22in the probability of con‡ict may lead to more local wars, an expansion in the
extent of international property rights (higher »), while reducing the level of in-
ternational “anarchy” and the importance of defense, may lead to a break-up of
countries, which may consequently bring about an increase in local con‡icts and
wars.
This result points to the second-best nature of ‘improvements’ in international
law. While a …rst-best world would emerge from perfectly de…ned international
control rights, quite a di¤erent outcome may result when one considers extensions
of international property rights that do not completely eliminate areas of anarchy
and indeterminacy. The post-cold-war world has seen both an increase in the
coordinated attemptsto enforceinternational agreementsand ‘control rights,’ and
an explosion of local con‡icts and separatism. Our analysis suggests a possible
explanation for the coexistence of the two phoenomena.
5 Concluding remarks
Our stylized model provides insights that seem consistent with recent develop-
ments. On the one hand secessions and break-up of countries should go hand
in hand with a reduction of international con‡ict, a lower probability of open
warfare, and a strengthening of international law. On the other hand, the actual
number of international con‡icts among smaller countries may increase as the re-
sult of the break-up of previously larger political unions. We also found that the
size of the “peace dividend” is in‡uenced by the process of country fragmentation
These implications of the model seem consistent with the world events that
have accompanied the “end of the cold war” . Following the end of a major
ideological and geopolitical confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West,
we have seen a reduction in the threat of a global war and, possibly, a greater
role for international institutions and the rule of international law. At the same
time, we have observed a number of secessions not only in the former Soviet
Union but also in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. While some
have been peaceful (Czechoslovakia), others have been followed by ethnic and
religious con‡icts and open warfare (former Yugoslavia, East Africa). Moreover,
the decline in the probability of a foreign threat seems to have been accompanied
by more vocal separatism and/or a trend towards more decentralization even in
those countries where actual secessions have not taken place.
Also, while military spending as percent of GDP has decreased in most coun-
tries during the 1990s, the size of the peace dividend seems lower than one may
have anticipated given the spectacular collapse of the Soviet Union and the dras-
tic reduction of a threat of a total East-West war. Data from various sources
23di¤er because of di¤erences in country coverage and de…nition of military ex-
penditure. Data for 90 countries from the International Institute of Strategic
Studies (IISS) show a decline in military spending of only 0.4 percent of GDP
between 1990 and 1994. WEO data show a decline in military spending of 1.2
percent of GDP between 1990 and 1995. Even within the WEO data set, almost
a third of the 130 countries maintained or increased their military spending as a
percent of GDP over the period (see Clements, Gupta, and Schi¤, 1997). In fact,
in several countries one has seen substantial increases in defense spending over
the period.37
Of course, our simple model is not meant to provide a complete and realistic
description of the world. In this paper, we have attempted to isolate one factor
(international con‡ict) among the numerous factors that can a¤ect the number
and size of countries. And we have attempted to study such a factor within
the simplest possible framework we could think of. In our analysis, we have
abstracted from many dimensions and details of actual international relations
and border formation, which should be taken into account when moving from
theoretical predictions to the historical record.38 However, we believe that our
model captures some essential and relevant aspects of the relationship between
international con‡ict and size distribution of political unions. In particular, we
think that the followinginsight is more general than ourspeci…c model: Incentives
to form larger political unions are likely to be higher in a more bellicose, anarchic
world, but a reduction in those incentives, by inducing political fragmentation,
may bring about its own dose of actual international tensions.
We should emphasize a few possible extensions of our approach. First, we
have ignored the role of multiple con‡icts and alliances, and the related problem
of free riding in defense spending by smaller members. To some extent, one can
reinterpret the “country” of our model as a group of allied countries, and view our
model of country formation as a model of alliance formation. If we reinterpret the
model this way, then we can also make sense of the fact that during the cold war
the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact became tighter alliances. At the apex of
the cold war, military alliances with close coordination of defense capabilities did
become the norm. In our model a “country” is a political unit in which defense is
completely and credibly centralized, and the “returns” from con‡ict are equally
distributed across its citizens. Henceforth, our model in its present form is not
designed to address issues of bargaining and free riding amongst allied countries.
37For instance, in a study by Clements, Gupta and Schi¤ (1997), the ten developing countries
with the largest increases in military spending during 1985-92 had an average increase of 2.7
pecentage points of GDP.
38In particular, one should consider additional variables, from which we have abstracted in
this paper, such as the role of international trade, democratization, etc. For example, on the
role of international openness see Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000).
24While those extensions, in principle, are not outside the scope of our framework,
we leave them for future research.
Secondly, we do not explicit study nondemocratic decision rules (nondemo-
cratic country formation and/or nondemocratic decisions over defense spending,
wars, divisions of spoils). One should notice that. within our framework, our
results are robust to a large range of decision rules, as individuals within regions
and across regions have homogeneous preferences over uni…cation, defense spend-
ing, etc. However, the analysis of more complex models in which decision rules
could make a crucial di¤erence is left for future research. More complex political
institutions may also give raise to additional reasons to engage in military con-
‡ict. For instance, Hess and Orphanides (1995, 1997) discuss the occurrence of
wars chosen strategically by governments in order to signal their competence in
military leadership and therefore to boost their chances of being re-elected when
faced with domestic problems.
A third extension that we do not pursue here is the introduction of ex-ante
income inequality within and across regions, as discussed, for instance, in Bolton
and Roland (1997). This feature may play an important role in the actual evo-
lution of con‡ict, peace, and the breakup of countries, and may be especially
important when we want to interpret the end of the cold war and the breakup
of the Soviet Union. More speci…cally, in our analysis we have assumed that the
“resource constraint” is not binding when defense is chosen within each country.
However, one could extend the model to allow for asymmetries and/or shocks
to national income that prevent one or more countries from achieving and/or
maintaining the “equilibrium” level of defense, with possible consequences to the
overall con…guration of countries.
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A.1. Ideological Con‡ict
While we have modeled con‡ict as appropriative/distributional (con‡ict over
the sharing of an economically valuable “pie”), our model of international con‡ict
between two sovereign countries can be reinterpreted in terms of “ideological
con‡ict.” For instance, consider two countries with di¤erent preferences over a
unidimensional ideological issue. As long as each country is able to decide its
own policies independently and without a¤ecting its neighbor, no con‡ict needs
to arise. However, it is possible that decisions in one country a¤ect individuals
in the other country. For instance, decisions may regard variables that a¤ect the
relationship between the two countries (i.e., regulation of pollution with cross-
borderspillovers), and/orpolicies that each country sees as of direct concern to its
citizens, even when taking place within the other country’s borders (say, human
rights, religious policies, etc.). While each country would like to impose its own
most preferred type, the equilibrium type will depend on the relative strength
of the two countries. To …x ideas, suppose that there exists a continuum of
“types” for some socioeconomic, cultural, religious or otherwise de…ned variable
that a¤ects both countries simultaneously. Say, the types are de…ned over the
segment [a;b]. Country j prefers type a, and obtains a payo¤ equal to (b ¡ x)G
whenever the “type” actually implemented is x such that a ￿ x ￿ b: Analogously,
country j0 prefers type b, and obtains a payo¤ equal to (x ¡ a)G for a ￿ x ￿ b:
When con‡ict is resolved through the use of the two countries’ relative strength
(i.e., by using dj and dj0), we have
x
¤ =
dj
dj + dj0
a +
dj0
dj + dj0
b
and the two countries “payo¤s” are given, respectively, by
dj
dj+dj0(b ¡ a)G and
dj0
dj+dj0(b ¡ a)G; which is formally equivalent to the above speci…cation for (b ¡
a)G = R. Therefore, within a preference/ideological context, R can be inter-
preted as a measure of the “ideological distance” between the two countries,
(b ¡ a) times the “relevance” of the issue, G.
While we do not pursue this speci…cation explicitly within our framework of
endogenous country formation, it is worth noting that our model of con‡ict can
be given this alternative interpretation.39
39A direct application of this alternative model of con‡ict to our game of endogenous country
formation would require a detailed speci…cation of how di¤erent preferences over speci…c issues
are distributed across regions and aggregated by uni…ed governments. While this may represent
an interesting extension, we leave it for future research.
26A.2. Derivations
Derivation of Lemma 1
In order to derive Lemma 1, we need to derive the equilibrium defense spend-
ing levels for each con…guration of countries.
Two countries
Denote with d¤
1 (d¤
2) equilibrium defense spending in country 1 (2) when there
are only two countries. The probability of a con‡ict between the two countries
is ¼=2: Therefore, the expected total payo¤ in country 1 as a function of defense
spending is given by
¼
2
d1
d1 + d2
R ¡d1
Analogously, country 2’s expected payo¤ per capita is :
¼
2
d2
d1 + d2
R ¡d2
The Nash-equilibrium levels of defense d¤
1 and d¤
2 are de…ned as
d
¤
1 = argmax
¼
2
Rd1
d1 + d¤
2
¡ d1 (A.1)
d
¤
2 = argmax
¼
2
Rd2
d¤
1 + d2
¡ d2 (A.2)
which imply the …rst order conditions
d¤
2
(d¤
1 + d¤
2)2 =
d¤
1
(d¤
1 + d¤
2)2 =
2
¼R
(A.3)
whose solution is
d
¤
1 = d
¤
2 =
¼R
8
(A.4)
As each country has a total population of size equal to 2, defense spending per
capita in each country is
27d¤
1
2
=
d¤
2
2
=
¼R
16
(A.5)
In a two-player game, a unique Nash equilibrium is also coalition-proof.
Three countries
When a country formed by two regions (say, country 1) coexists with two
independent regions (say, country 2 and country 3), the Nash-equilibrium levels
of defense equilibrium defense d¤
1, d¤
2 and d¤
3 are given by
d
¤
1 = argmax
d1
¼R
4
[
d1
d1 + d¤
2
+
d1
d1 + d¤
3
] ¡d1 (A.6)
d
¤
2 = argmax
d2
¼R
4
[
d2
d¤
1 + d2
+
d2
d2 + d¤
3
] ¡d2 (A.7)
d
¤
3 = argmax
d3
¼R
4
[
d3
d¤
1 + d3
+
d3
d¤
2 + d3
] ¡d3 (A.8)
whose solution is:
d
¤
1 = d
¤
2 = d
¤
3 =
¼R
8
(A.9)
As country one has a population of size equal to 2, while countries 2 and 3 have
population of sizes 2 and 3 each,.we have level of defense per capita equal to
¼R
16
in country 1, and equal to
¼R
8 in countries 2 and 3.
We also need to show that the above Nash equilibrium (A.9) is also coalition-
proof. To verify that, note that, given any set of defense spending by any proper
subset of countries, the game induced on the remaining countries has a unique
Nash equilibrium.
Speci…cally:
a) given the level of defense spending in country 1 (d1), the game induced on
countries 2 and 3 has a unique Nash equilibrium, given by
d
¤
2(d1) = argmax
d2
¼R
4
[
d2
d1 + d2
+
d2
d2 + d¤
3(d1)
] ¡d2 (A.10)
28d
¤
3(d1) = argmax
d3
¼R
4
[
d3
d1 + d3
+
d3
d¤
2(d1) + d3
] ¡d3 (A.11)
b) given the level of defense spending in country 2 (d2), the game induced on
countries 1 and 3 has a unique Nash equilibrium characterized by the solution of
the following two …rst-order conditions:
d
¤
1(d2) = argmax
d1
¼R
4
[
d1
d1 + d2
+
d1
d1 + d¤
3(d2)
] ¡d1 (A.12)
d
¤
3(d2) = argmax
d3
¼R
4
[
d3
d¤
1(d2) + d3
+
d3
d2 + d3
] ¡d3 (A.13)
Analogously, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the game induced on
countries 1 and 2, given the actions of country 3.
Since the game induced on the remaining countries has a unique Nash equilib-
rium for any set of choices of defense spending by any proper subset of countries,
we have that, by de…nition, the set of coalition-proof equilibria coincide with the
Pareto e¢cient frontier of the set of Nash equilibria,40 which, in our case, is given
by the unique Nash equilibrium as characterized in equation (A.9).
Four countries
When four independent countries (say, countries 1,2,3, and 4), each of size
equal to 1, coexist, the Nash equilibrium is given by
d
¤
1 = argmax
d1
f
¼R
4
[
d1
d1 + d¤
2
+
d1
d1 + d¤
4
] ¡ d1g (A.14)
d
¤
2 = argmax
d2
f
¼R
4
[
d2
d¤
1 + d2
+
d2
d2 + d¤
3
] ¡ d2g (A.15)
d
¤
3 = argmax
d3
f
¼R
4
[
d3
d¤
2 + d3
+
d3
d3 + d¤
4
] ¡ d3g (A.16)
d
¤
4 = argmax
d4
f
¼R
4
[
d4
d¤
1 + d4
+
d4
d¤
3 + d4
] ¡ d4g (A.17)
40See Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987), p. 8.
29whose solution is
d
¤
1 = d
¤
2 = d
¤
3 = d
¤
4 =
¼R
8
(A.18)
which implies defense spending per capita equal to
¼R
8 in each country.
As in the case of three countries, it is straightforward to show that, given
any set of defense spending by any proper subset of countries, the game induced
on the remaining countries has a unique Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the lev-
els of defense derived in equation (A.17) characterize the unique coalition-proof
equilibrium defense levels.
The above analysis shows that, for any possible con…guration of countries, in
equilibrium we have that a country formed by two regions has defense per capita
equal to
¼R
16 , while a country formed by one region has defense per capita equal
to ¼R
8 : QED
Derivation of Lemma 2
The expected returnsfromcon‡ict (includingpotential con‡ict that isresolved
within a country’s borders) can be calculated as follows:
With two country, individuals in country 1 expect:
1
2
[
¼R
4
+
¼R
2
d¤
1
d¤
1 + d¤
2
] =
¼R
4
(A.19)
The same returns are expected by individuals in country 2.
With three countries, individuals in the larger country (say, country 1) expect:
1
2
[
¼R
4
+
¼R
4
d¤
1
d¤
1 + d¤
2
+
¼R
4
d¤
1
d¤
1 + d¤
3
] =
¼R
4
(A.20)
while the two smaller countries (say, countries 2 and 3) expect
¼R
4
d¤
2
d¤
1 + d¤
2
+
¼R
4
d¤
2
d¤
2 + d¤
3
=
¼R
4
d¤
3
d¤
1 + d¤
3
+
¼R
4
d¤
3
d¤
2 + d¤
3
=
¼R
4
(A.21)
Finally, analogous calculations show that, with four countries, each will expect¼R
4 :
30The war costs are given by ¼
2
½c
2 in a country formed by two regions (i.e., si = 2)
and
¼
2½c in a country formed by one region (i.e., si = 1). Therefore, Lemma 2
holds.
Derivation of Lemma 3
As shown above, the absolute level of defense in equilibrium is always ¼R
8 .
Therefore, the expected probability of winning a con‡ict is 1/2 for each country.
In a country formed by two regions, expected con‡ict returns per capita net of
expected war costs are given by
¼R
4
1
2
+
¼
2
[
R
2
¡ ½
c
2
] =
¼(R ¡ ½c)
4
where the …rst term indicates the “peaceful” division of R within the country,
the second term indicates the expected payo¤ from con‡ict resolution, and the
third term refers to the costs of war.
By contrast, net payo¤ in a country formed by one region is
¼
2
[
1
2
R ¡ ½c] =
¼(R ¡ 2½c)
4
Individual utility in a country formed by two regions is
Uuni = y ¡
¼R
16
+
¼(R ¡ ½c)
4
¡ hk
while in a country formed by one region individual utility is given by
Uind = y ¡
¼R
8
+
¼(R ¡ 2½c)
4
therefore, uni…cation is (strictly) preferred to independence if and only if
¼
4
(
R
4
+ ½c) > hk
QED.
Derivation of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 is an immediate implication of Lemma 3.
31It is immediate to see that Proposition 1 characterizes a Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, for any other Nash equilibrium there will be a group of individuals who
will be strictly bettero¤ by deviating and moving to the equilibriumcharacterized
in Proposition 1.
First, consider the case
¼
4(
R
4 + ½c) < hw. In this case, voting for indepen-
dence is a dominant strategy for each individual. For any equilibrium in which
a majority has voted for uni…cation, there exists a coalition of individuals (in
fact, everybody) who would be better o¤ by switching to independence. Hence,
independence for all regions is the only outcome that can be sustained as a
Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
When hw <
¼
4(
R
4 +½c) < he; any outcome in which the East is uni…ed would be
upset by a majority (in fact, all) Eastern individuals, who are better o¤ when the
two Eastern regions are independent. On the other hand, voting for uni…cation
is the dominant strategy in the West.
When
¼
4(
R
4 + ½c) > he; voting for uni…cation is the dominant strategy every-
where.
QED
A.3 Regions with M voters
For simplicity, in the text we have assumed that the number of voters in
each region is equal to one. It is easy to show that our results do not depend
on that simpli…cation. As governments maximize the sum of utilities, payo¤s in
stage two and three are just multiplied by either M or 2M, and give the same
equilibrium outcomes. In stage one, all individuals in each region have the same
utility function. In particular, Lemma 3 can be reformulated as follows:
Lemma 3’
Given heterogeneity cost hk (k = w;e), and given the equilibrium payo¤s
associated with all possible con…gurations of countries (i.e., with all terminal two-
stage subgames), individuals will (strictly) prefer to live in a two-region country
rather than in an independent region if and only if
¼
4M
(
R
4
+ ½c) > hk
When we consider coalition-proof equilibria, we have that all voters within a
region will coordinate on their non weakly dominated strategy (uni…cation if
32¼
4M(R
4 + ½c) > hk, independence if ¼
4M(R
4 + ½c) ￿ hk). Therefore, it is immediate
to show that Proposition 1 can be reformulated as follows:
Proposition 1’
For all 0 < hw ￿ he; ¼ ¸ 0, c ¸ 0 and 0 ￿ ½ ￿ 1; and M ¸ 1 in equilibrium
we will have
1) Four independent regions (N = 4) if and only if
¼
4M
(
R
4
+ ½c) ￿ hw:
2) A uni…ed West and two independent countries in the East (N = 3) if and only
if
hw <
¼
4M
(
R
4
+ ½c) ￿ he:
3) A uni…ed West and a uni…ed East (N = 2) if and only if
¼
4M
(
R
4
+ ½c) > he:
The comparative-statics of changes in M will depend on whether any other pa-
rameter (e.g., R; he; hw) is a function of M .
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